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This paper analyses the case for selective industrial and trade policies in Africa, drawing
upon the lessons of East Asia. It reviews the theoretical arguments for government
intervention in the context of technological learning, and relates this to the new environment
of rapid technical change and globalisation of production. It also considers the risks of
government failure in mounting selective policies, and concludes that the degree of selectivity
has to be much less than in East Asia. The case for selective policies nevertheless remains
strong, if Africa is to make any industrial progress.
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1. Introduction
The present climate for industrial policy is hostile. The ‘rules of the game’ set by the Bretton Woods
institutions, WTO and major donors, are set against most forms of government intervention to
promote industry. In the near future, governments will have almost none of the instruments of policy
used through history to promote industrial development. Yet, targeted interventions in trade, industry
and supporting institutions have played a critical role in industrialisation through history. All major
industrialised countries used extended protection and other selective measures to promote industry,
and to develop the institutions needed to support industrial and technological activity. The benefits of
protection have been long debated (Reinert, 1995, and Vernon, 1989); that of other interventions
have been relatively neglected. This neglect continues today, to the detriment of the analysis of
industrial policy.
The new consensus seems to be that all selective industrial policy is economically undesirable and
harmful. While there has been some swing back from the extreme neoliberal position of the early
1990s, which denied any role for the government beyond providing essential public goods and
security, mainstream economics strictly confines the role of governments. In the terminology
developed by the World Bank (1993), this role is a ‘market friendly’ one of improving deficient
factor markets. There is no legitimate government role in ‘selectivity’, altering the market-driven
allocation of resources between productive activities (Lall, 1996, Soludo, 1998, Westphal, 1998).
However, economic theory justifies selectivity where market failures affect some activities more than
others, and restoring equilibrium calls for more intervention in specific activities. There is such a case
in promoting industries and technologies once we relax certain simplifying assumptions on how
information (and within this, industrial technology) is created, exchanged, absorbed and used. In
practice, the experience of the most successful developing countries today – the East Asian Tigers –
shows that selective industrial policy can work, economically and politically.
The purpose here is to clarify the case for industrial policy in economic terms, to show that
industrial policy was actually implemented by developing country governments, and to consider
their relevance for Africa. I fully accept that the removal of many existing policies (including
‘classic’ import-substitution strategies and interventions that give rise to rent seeking) is necessary
for development, and that a substantial dose of liberalisation is a precondition for industrial success. I
also accept that the progress of technology and globalisation over the past three decades limits the
exercise of industrial policy today. However, I argue that there is still considerable scope for
legitimate industrial policy, much greater than the new rule of the game allow. In fact, the very pace
of technical change today, and the intensification of competitive pressures in liberalised trade
regimes, makes it more important than before to mount industrial policy. Africa, suffering massive
and widespread deindustrialisation, needs supportive policies that go well beyond the neoliberal
consensus. To mount such policies, it is necessary to raise government capabilities: this becomes a
critical part of the new industrial policy.
2. Basic Concepts
The economic argument for intervention rests on the presence of market failure. If markets worked
perfectly, they would (by assumption) achieve ‘optimal’ resource allocation and there would be noQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 3
economic ground for intervention. If, on the other hand, markets were missing or functioned badly,
intervention to restore optimality would be justified. This argument derives from static models of
perfect competition, in which ‘failures’ are defined by departures from Pareto optimality with its host
of simplifying and rigorous conditions. Textbook versions of market failure are imperfect
competition, public goods and externalities. These are relatively restricted cases of failure that can, at
least in theory, be corrected by governments – they do not seriously affect the theoretical case for
perfect markets. However, as economists like Stiglitz (1994, 1996) point out, failures in information
markets are much more widespread and diffuse and do threaten the theoretical case. When such
‘diffuse’ and pervasive market failures are present, it does not even make sense to think of
conventional market failures, where it is possible to return to an equilibrium state with perfect
information, certainty, lack of externalities and scale economies and full property rights. How then
can the concept of market failure be used to analyse the need for policy?
The industrial policy literature draws a distinction between ‘functional’ interventions, that are not
directed as specific activities, and ‘selective’ interventions, that are (Pack and Westphal, 1986, Lall,
1996). The mainstream position today, as noted, is that functional interventions may be justified but
selective ones never are. It defines the former as market friendly and the latter as (undesirable)
industrial policy. The case rests on two, mutually reinforcing, arguments. The first is economic, that
governments cannot improve on the information processing capabilities of even imperfect markets to
mount selective policies, though they can mount functional ones. The second is political, that
governments are inherently corruptible and can never be trusted with selectivity. The argument is
tendentious and biased. Both functional and selective interventions are ‘industrial policy’, since
both try to improve upon free market outcomes. Whether or not governments can improve upon
free markets depends on the circumstances and stage of development: a priori generalisations are
impossible. Similarly, whether or not governments can handle selectively efficiently is a context
specific issue: political preconceptions should not be introduced to pass sweeping judgements.
While the distinction between functional and selective interventions appears to be useful at first sight,
it is impossible to apply in practice. First, there are many possible levels of selectivity, ranging from
supporting the whole of manufacturing, to supporting a wide range of related activities (e.g. metal
working), to supporting particular activities (machine tools) and particular technologies (computer
numerically controlled tools) and specific vintages of technology or firms. Second, the line between
selective and functional interventions is very difficult to draw. The same policy can be functional or
selective, depending on its intention, specificity and context. For instance, strengthening vocational
training may be functional in one case, and selective in another (if training for, say, ship-building or
CNC machine-tool operations were being targeted).
Establishing that markets can fail is not difficult. However, this does not automatically establish the
case for intervention. Since most interventions have their own costs and risks, it has to be
established that the benefits outweigh these costs. The outcome depends upon the extent and cost
of the market failures in question, the ability of markets to develop solutions, and the ability of
governments to design and implement the necessary interventions. The design of certain interventions
calls for information and monitoring, while their efficient implementation requires autonomy, skills and
impartiality. Many of these conditions are not met in developing countries. Thus, the cost of
“government failures” has to weighed against the cost of market failures.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 4
3. The Need for Industrial Policy
3.1 The Micro Foundations
The neoclassical case against government interventions rests on strong assumptions about market
efficiency, in turn based upon a particular conceptualisation of technology at the enterprise level.
It assumes that technology is freely available from a known ‘shelf’ on which there is full information.
Firms optimise by choosing from this shelf according to their factor and product prices. Any
intervention is necessarily distorting to resource allocation. The selected technology is absorbed
costlessly and risklessly by the enterprise and used at efficient (‘best practice’) levels. There is no
need for intervention to support the process: the underlying assumptions ensure that any observed
industrial inefficiency is due to government interventions. The removal of such interventions then
becomes the necessary and sufficient condition for restoring efficiency.
If there is any lag in efficiency it can, at most, only be for a brief period in which scale economies are
fully realised or costs fall in an automatic ‘learning by doing’ process. However, these lags are
predictable (scale economies are given by technical design parameters, while the learning curve is
known) and a simple function of the quantity of output. Again, there is no need for intervention
because firms can anticipate the process and raise money in efficient capital markets to finance the
learning process. If capital markets fail, the correct solution is to improve their functioning rather than
to intervene selectively to support particular activities. Thus, capital market failures and scale
economies do not provide grounds for selective intervention in resource allocation. A second-best
case for selectivity exists only when these failures cannot be remedied readily, and protection or
subsidies are used as intermediate solutions.
An alternative to the neoclassical approach is the ‘technological capability’ approach.
1 This draws
upon the evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter (1982), and locates learning in markets prone
to imperfections, satisficing behaviour and widespread failures. Its policy conclusions are based in
deficient markets; it is explicitly behavioural and institutional, opening up the ‘black box’ of firms
and markets (for an application to technology policy making, see Lall and Teubal, 1998). It inserts a
layer of behavioural analysis between investment and performance. A distinction is made between
capacity (physical installed capacity) and capability (the ability to use that capacity efficiently).
Technological capabilities are then the skills — technical, managerial or organisational —firms need
to utilise efficiently the hardware (equipment) and software (information) of technology. Capabilities
are firm-specific, institutional knowledge made up of individual skills and experience accumulated
over time. Moreover, capabilities are not linearly added, but contain a synergistic element arising
from the interaction between individuals and firms. Technological effort is not the same as
‘innovation’, the normal connotation of technological change in economics. In fact, most
technological effort does not take place at the frontier of technology at all. It covers a much broader
range of effort that every enterprise must undertake to access, implement, absorb and build upon the
knowledge required in production. This is true as long as the technology is new to the enterprise or
country buying it, whether or not it is new or mature elsewhere. Technology cannot simply be
transferred to a developing country like a physical product: its effective implantation has to
                                                
1 For a representative sample see Bell and Pavitt (1993), Dahlman et al. (1987), Enos (1992), Lall (1996, 1992) and Pack
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include important elements of capability building: simply providing equipment and operating
instructions, patents, designs or blueprints does not ensure that the technology will be effectively
utilised. There are strong tacit elements in the technology that require effort and entail uncertainty.
In the evolutionary approach, as a result, there is no predictable learning curve down which all firms
travel. Much depends on the efficacy with which markets or institutions function, uncertainty
is coped with, externalities tapped, and coordination achieved. If the learning period, costs,
uncertainties and leakages are very high, coordination with other firms in the supply chain
exceptionally difficult, or information, labor and capital markets particularly unresponsive, ‘difficult’
knowledge may not be absorbed – even where it would be efficient to do so. The capability
approach does not suggest that no industry will take root in free markets. Where there is a modicum
of skills, infrastructure and cheap labour, simple labour-intensive activities will start. However,
upgrading into more complex and demanding technologies may be limited in the absence of
interventions to overcome learning costs. Such interventions cannot be functional — since
technologies differ in their learning needs, they have to be selective.
The protection of infant industries is one, and historically the most popular and effective, means of
selective intervention. However, protection can be a dangerous tool. Apart from the cost it imposes
on consumers, it dilutes the incentive to invest in capability development, the very process it is meant
to foster. Firms are very sensitive to competitive pressures in deciding to invest in capabilities, and
the protection offered in typical import-substituting regimes tended to detract from costly and lengthy
investments in competitive skills and knowledge. There may be many solutions: offer limited
protection; impose performance requirements; or enforce early entry into export markets while
maintaining domestic protection. The last has the added advantage that it taps the information
externalities of export activity, and was the one used by the larger Asian NIEs.
It is important to distinguish the ownership of enterprises. Market failures are particularly binding for
local enterprises, particularly smaller ones. Foreign investors tend to face fewer failures. Their
raison d’être is the internalisation of intermediate markets (for capital, skills and technology). This is
why MNCs may be an effective means of launching industrialisation (as long as complementary
factors exist). Their significance is greatest where technologies are changing rapidly, production is
tightly linked across nations, and market access is difficult for new entrants. However, the
advantages offered by FDI does not mean that the best way to develop is to adopt passive “open
door” policies that leave matters entirely to free markets. There can be two important types of
market failures in the foreign investment process.
4. Lessons from East Asia
4.1 Background
Let us start with a brief historical sketch of the growth of competitive industry in East Asia, focusing
on the leading Tiger economies. These were first countries to launch on export-oriented
manufacturing, the Asian Tigers, adopted outward looking policies in the early 1960s (Hong Kong
was always free trade) and led the first wave of LT assembly exports: garments, textiles, toys,
footwear and the like. Over the 1970s and 80s, they upgraded their export structures in different
ways and moved into more complex products. In Hong Kong, once the leader in the developing
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faire policies led to relatively little structural deepening. As a result, with rising wages, most
manufacturing shifted to lower wage countries, and industrial and export growth stagnated or turned
negative. The export structure remained at low technology levels, the lowest among the Tigers.
In Singapore, by contrast, there was considerable deepening, allowing it to combine rising wages
(nearly 20% higher than in Hong Kong) with continued output and export growth. Singapore moved
rapidly from LT to petrochemicals and then producer electronics and equipment, simultaneously
raising its technological levels from simple assembly to high-end manufacturing, design and
development. The process was dominated by MNCs, which provided state-of-the-art technologies
and access to their global networks. This gave Singapore the most hi-tech export structure in the
developing world, though its research base remained relatively small and the sources of innovation
remained overseas. The deepening was driven by strong industrial policy, using FDI targeting along
with selective investments in skills, technology and infrastructure, all directed at meeting the specific
needs of the sponsored activities (Lall, 1996).
In Korea and Taiwan, MNCs played a much smaller role: domestic firms led the deepening and
upgrading. Their governments used infant industry protection (offsetting its harmful effects by strong
export incentives), credit allocation and subsidies, FDI restrictions, and skills and technology
support, to induce them to enter difficult activities, raise local content and take on advanced
technological functions. Korea’s interventions were very pervasive and detailed, and involved
fostering the chaebol, the conglomerates that spearheaded its heavy industry and high technology
drive, learned the most advanced technologies, and became major multinationals in their own right
(below). Taiwan intervened less directly in the industrial structure, though it used public enterprises
to enter several heavy industries. It supported its small and medium enterprise dominated structure
with an array of technology, training, finance and export marketing policies and institutions (Wade,
1990, Lall, 1996).
As a result, Korea and Taiwan have the greatest technological depth in the developing world,
and their exports embody the most intense learning. This has been supported by the massive
investments in R&D and technical skills, described at greater length below.
4.2 Learning among the Leaders
4.2.1 Introduction
The mature Asian Tigers had many common elements in their industrial development. According to
the World Bank (1993), they had sound macroeconomic management, a good initial base of human
capital and strong export-orientation. They provided stable and predictable incentive frameworks
for investment. They had high rates of saving and investment — some of the highest in recent history
— which financed investments in the hardware and software of learning. They invested in
administrative and institutional capital, both necessary to making markets work better and to
mounting effective policies. Their governments had close and continuous dialogue with the private
sector, and the granting of privileges was closely monitored and made to depend on export
performance. They used ‘contests’ to monitor performance and to ensure that favours were
returned, unlike other countries where privileges were generally granted to industry with no
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and what became the world’s most dynamic region. They interacted with, and learned from, each
other. They gained from the spillovers of a favourable investment image.
What was ignored by neoclassical analysts was that these common elements went together with
striking differences in development ‘visions’, which shaped crucial elements of their strategies,
each involving different kinds and levels of intervention. It is difficult, in fact, to describe their policies
are ‘remedying market failures’ in the conventional sense. The Tigers were not trying to make
markets work better to achieve some static equilibrium. They were choosing between countless
potential equilibria, and bending their resources to obtain the ones they had (more or less clearly)
selected. Though there were some generic problems they addressed in similar ways (improving the
technology infrastructure or providing basic education and training), they used various tools of policy
differently to pursue their different visions (Lall, 1996). Since they were all successful (to a greater or
lesser extent), because of the coherence of their policies and good administrative capabilities, clearly
there are not only ‘many roads to heaven’ but also many heavens. The tools were not that different
from those used in less successful economies —  the secret lay in the combination of policies and
the efficacy of their implementation.
4.2.2 Different Incentive Regimes
Korea had the strongest ambitions to develop a diverse, technologically advanced, nationally-owned
industrial structure, and had to mount the most comprehensive set of interventions to achieve this.
These included quantitative and tariff restrictions on imports, strong export subsidies and targeting,
subsidised and guided credit and the promotion of giant conglomerates (Westphal, 1990). FDI was
kept to the minimum, with foreign technology sought aggressively in all non-equity forms. Korea was
at the time the largest importer of capital goods in the developing world. The government, to ensure
better terms and deeper knowledge transfer, vetted other forms of technology import, such as
licensing, consultancy and turnkey contracts. It shaped industrial development at a very detailed
level, and with it the technological effort that was needed to compete in world markets, export
orientation disciplining both firms and bureaucrats. Entire sets of heavy industries were promoted
together to exploit linkages and externalities, with changes being made as events unfolded and some
activities proved unviable. As its conglomerates grew in strength and spread, they were encouraged
to establish affiliates overseas, to increase market presence and seek new technologies.
Taiwan lacked the political economy to mount such detailed interventions. Nevertheless, it used
trade and credit policies to guide the technological upgrading of an economy dominated by small and
medium sized enterprises. Public enterprises were used to enter areas where the private sector was
reluctant. Enterprises were encouraged into skill and technology-intensive activities, with inputs from
selectively used FDI and a superlative extension and technology support system (Dahlman and
Sananikone, 1990). The government guided and co-ordinated the import and absorption of
exceptionally difficult new technologies. Taiwan did not achieve the extent of heavy industrialization
of Korea, but retained a more flexible, less concentrated structure. The government encouraged
outward investment to relocate labor-intensive activities that were became uncompetitive over time.
As with Korea, it had a series of comprehensive technology plans that guided the allocation of
resources in this area; and, similarly, it encouraged outward investment to seek cheaper locations
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Singapore, the smallest of the Tigers, started with a weak entrepreneurial base and decided to rely
heavily on FDI, which it targeted and guided to enter more complex activities and functions within a
free trade setting. As with Taiwan, public enterprises were used to spearhead particularly difficult
activities. It developed the perhaps the most efficient and honest system of administration in the
region. Its FDI targeting worked not only because of this, but also because the government could
build up a base of technical and managerial skills geared specifically to the industrial targets it set
(Singapore reputedly has one of the most skilled and efficient work forces in the world). The result
was that it built up the most high-tech export structure in the region.
Hong Kong was closest to laissez faire among the Tigers. Its industrial development started with a
unique base: developed financial and trading services, excellent infrastructure, and a supply of
entrepreneurs, engineers and technicians. It provided cheap land to manufacturers, extension and
information services to producers and exporters, and then let firms follow the dictates of the world
market with little interference. However, its neglect of technological deepening left it with a light
industrial structure and low R&D capabilities, leading to massive deindustrialization and the
relocation of much of its manufacturing base to cheaper wage areas. This process did not reverse its
overall growth, since its unique location and its developed services structure allowed it to move into
other activities (very dependent on the mainland). However, Hong Kong has been the only Tiger to
suffer a consistent decline in manufacturing output; the share of manufacturing in GDP has fallen from
27 percent at its peak to under 7 percent today.
4.2.3 Accessing Technology
Foreign knowledge is the primary input into the development of local capabilities, and it is available
in many forms. Facilitating access to knowledge in all its forms is vital to development policy; as
noted, however, not all forms of transfer have equal effects on domestic learning. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflows are perhaps the most important form of access, but developing countries
used this channel to very different extents (Table 1). Others include a variety of links with technology
suppliers, from the purchase of equipment to lengthy licensing and other arrangements. The Tigers
were open to international information flows and sought foreign knowledge, embodied and
disembodied, avidly. Nevertheless, each adopted a different approach to how it tapped this
knowledge, and how it combined it with differing strategies for promoting local learning. Let us
recount the main strategies used.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 9
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5.5 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.5 4.4
W. Europe 8.9 5.3 5.3 5.8 5.1 6.7
N.
America
5.5 3.4 2.5 3.8 5.5 4.6
All
developing
8.0 4.4 5.1 6.6 8.0 8.2
N. Africa 2.7 2.2 3.8 4.1 5.7 3.0
Other
Africa
9.2 7.3 6.4 8.2 12.5 13.2
L. America 11.3 7.8 8.1 7.2 10.3 11.0
W. Asia 1.2 1.7 1.5 2.2 1.0 -0.6
S. & E.
Asia
9.7 3.8 4.7 7.5 8.3 9.0
C. & E.
Europe
1.0 0.4 0.8 7.9 5.0 5.2
Selected Developing Countries
H Kong 12.2 2.3 7.7 7.1 8.2 8.4
Singapore 59.3 33.6 12.4 23.0 23.0 24.6
Korean
Rep.
1.9 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.1
Taiwan 5.1 3.1 1.8 1.8 2.5 2.7
China 14.5 3.3 7.8 7.1 8.2 8.4
Indonesia 7.6 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.7 6.5
Malaysia 43.7 23.8 26.0 22.5 16.1 17.9
Thailand 10.2 4.9 4.8 3.4 2.3 2.9
Philippines 13.6 6.0 2.1 9.6 10.5 9.0
India 1.2 0.3 0.4 1.0 2.4 3.6
Pakistan 5.1 3.3 3.5 3.5 4.6 6.7
B'desh 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 ..
S. Lanka 6.9 2.4 5.4 7.5 5.3 2.0
Argentina 13.0 15.1 25.5 31.0 4.8 11.7
Brazil 3.1 1.4 3.0 1.3 3.0 4.7
Chile 21.5 7.3 7.2 6.9 14.0 10.8
Mexico 16.9 8.5 6.4 6.0 14.3 17.1
Egypt 3.1 2.8 5.3 6.4 14.8 7.2
Morocco 8.5 5.1 6.6 8.0 8.8 4.1
Tunisia 14.7 4.0 12.5 13.7 10.2 6.1QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 10
Turkey 3.5 2.3 2.3 1.4 1.6 2.2
Cote
d'Ivoire
-0.6 2.1 -29.1 10.7 3.3 1.5
Ghana 17.8 2.3 2.5 9.4 22.6 22.2
Kenya 1.3 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 1.7
Mauritius 4.5 2.4 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.9
Nigeria 34.9 19.8 26.3 36.5 50.5 50.0
Uganda 8.4 0.2 0.6 10.1 12.6 21.1
Tanzania 3.3 0.3 1.1 2.0 -0.4 ..
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment
Report 1997.
Hong Kong: In line with its laissez faire approach, the Hong Kong government did not influence
the extent or form of technology imports. Its industrial and manufactured export growth was sparked
off by an influx of seasoned textile and other entrepreneurs and technicians from Mainland China.
This led to the growth of dynamic small and medium-sized exporters specialised in labor-intensive
activities such as textiles, garments, toys and simple consumer electronics, mainly aimed at world
markets. Given the initial endowment of skills and learning, they obtained the information and
technologies they needed in mainly externalised forms, primarily capital goods.
The economy’s colonial administration, its long experience of entrepôt trade, and the strong
presence of expatriate-run trading, finance, property and other enterprises (the “Hongs”),
strengthened the initial base of skills with an advanced physical, administrative, trading and financial
infrastructure for export activity.
Despite open door policies to FDI, Hong Kong’s manufacturing was dominated by indigenous firms.
MNCs went mainly into service activities, while those that entered manufacturing specialised in more
advanced technologies within the same broad labor-intensive set of activities as local firms. The
government made no effort, at least until recently, to target high technology FDI or to induce
industrial deepening and technological upgrading. Technological information needs were relatively
simple, and were fulfilled by scouting international suppliers of equipment (greatly helped by the
liberal trading environment and the Hongs), growing contacts with export markets, and some
government technology support institutions. The presence of foreign buyers was a vital source of
technological information and assistance. Over time there was significant upgrading of equipment and
products within the low-technology activities that the colony started with, but there was relatively
little entry into complex and research intensive technologies that the other NIEs were targeting.
Singapore: Singapore has a much smaller economy than Hong Kong’s, but has deepened its
industrial structure much more by deliberate knowledge strategies. It started, like Hong Kong, with a
strategic location and established entrepôt facilities but with a smaller base of trading and financial
activity. Despite a tradition of shipbuilding, Singapore had a weak entrepreneurial base and did not
have an influx of experienced businessmen and technologists from mainland China. Nor did it have
access to a large, poorer but culturally similar hinterland to which it could sell its services. After a
spell of import substitution, it switched to free trade and pursued growth through seeking and
targeting foreign direct investment, while raising domestic resources by various measures. Moreover,QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 11
it deepened its industrial and export structure by using incentives to persuade MNCs to move from
labor to capital, skill and technology-intensive activities. Its knowledge policy was directed at
consciously acquiring, and subsequently upgrading, the most modern technologies in highly
internalised forms.
To attract foreign investment and induce upgrading, Singapore invested heavily in education and
training and physical infrastructure. It developed an efficient, industrially oriented, higher education
structure, along with one of the best systems in the world for specialised worker training. Its policies
for attracting FDI were based on liberal entry and ownership conditions, easy access to expatriate
skills, very efficient and honest administration, and generous incentives for the activities that it was
seeking to promote. It set up the Economic Development Board (EDB) to co-ordinate policy, offer
incentives to guide foreign investors into targeted activities, acquire and create industrial estates to
attract multinational corporation, and generally to mastermind industrial policy. The public sector
played an important role in launching and promoting some activities chosen by the government,
acting as a catalyst to private investment or entering areas that were too risky for it to enter. In
recent years the government has sought to increase linkages with local enterprises by promoting
subcontracting and improving extension services.
Taiwan: Taiwan started on import-substitution in the 1950s with a strong base of human capital and
a large population of SMEs. As with Korea, it switched to export orientation in the 1960s, but
retained protection and targeting to promote and guide industrial growth. It combined these with
interventions in technology transfer to support technology development by local enterprises. It drew
upon the whole gamut of technology imports, but changed the balance and the policy regime over
time. In the 1950s, it sought to attract FDI, with no discrimination by origin, destination (only
services were restricted for foreign entry) or degree of ownership. In the 1960s, FDI was sought in
labor-intensive industries like textiles, garments and electronics assembly. In the 1970s, with rising
wages and a need to upgrade industry, the government targeted higher technology, discouraging
labor-intensive FDI and favouring it in automation, informatics and precision instruments. Targeting
was strengthened in the 1980s.
Thus, as the industrial sector developed and technologies deepened over time, FDI policy in Taiwan
became more discriminatory. The government exercised more detailed surveillance (often on a case-
by-case basis) to ensure that the technology was in line with changing national priorities. It targeted
emerging technologies, and placed strict conditions on investors to benefit the technology
development of  domestic firms. Where domestic firms were strong, FDI was actively discouraged;
where they were weak, foreign firms were made to diffuse technology and contribute to local
capabilities. With yet more development of local capabilities, controls on FDI were relaxed but
support of technology development continued. In the meantime, Taiwanese firms themselves became
major investors overseas, spurred by the need to relocate labor-intensive activities and an enormous
balance of payments surplus.
The government sought to maximise benefits from FDI for local firms by promoting local sourcing
and subcontracting — an exceptionally successful strategy for enhancing technological and skill
linkages with foreign firms (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1990). This involved local content rules,
backed by provisions that foreign firms transfer skills and technology to subcontractors and raise the
technological capabilities of local firms. The Taiwanese government also played a direct role in
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capabilities. It often set up strategic research alliances on the behalf of local firms and co-ordinated
their efforts to build upon these to build competitive new capabilities.
Foreign firms accounted for a relatively small part of Taiwan’s industrial and export success. Local
enterprises, led by SMEs, led the export drive, first by using the ‘Chinese connection’ in Asia and
then, as their horizons widened, by tapping Japanese trading companies and American mass-market
buyers. In the 1960s, about 60% of textile exports were sold through Japanese trading houses (the
sogo shosha), and even today these handle a third to half of Taiwanese exports. Such are the
economies of scale and information collection in world markets that small firms find it difficult and
costly to export alone even after years of experience (this is in contrast to Korea, where the
government internalised these functions within local trading houses, part of the chaebol). US buyers
grew more important over time, with the government facilitating contacts with small suppliers, with
aggressive assistance from industry associations and other private organisations. In addition, there
also emerged many (relatively small) local trading houses, which proved to be valuable sources of
technical, design and marketing information to exporters. Large multinational producers, that
sourced complex electronic and related products under OEM (original equipment manufacture)
arrangements in Taiwan, were even more significant sources of technology transfer.
Korea: Korea preferred externalised technology imports even more strongly. It relied primarily on
capital goods imports, licensing and other technology transfer agreements to acquire technology
(Westphal, 1990). FDI was permitted when it was the only way of obtaining the technology or
gaining access to world markets. Even then the government encouraged majority Korean-owned or
equal joint ventures; in some cases foreign investors were forced to sell out after the technology had
been absorbed locally. As a result, Korea had the lowest level of reliance on FDI of almost any
developing countries with a non-communist economy. The government also intervened often in
technology imports to lower prices and strengthen the position of local buyers, but in a flexible way
that did not constrain access to expensive know-how. The regime encouraged reverse engineering
and R&D by technology importing firms to develop indigenous technological capabilities; many of
the larger firms were later able to  enter into collaborative ventures with world technology leaders on
a more equal basis. In the field of plant and process engineering, the government stipulated that
foreign contractors transfer their design knowledge to local firms, which quickly absorbed design
technologies in some process industries.
4.2.4 Building Human Resources
Using knowledge more effectively requires higher levels of human resources within enterprises and
elsewhere. Building human resources involves two distinct processes — skill development and
capability formation. ‘Skill development’ means formal education and training (including that in
firms). ‘Capability formation’ means the development of skills and knowledge derived from
technological and managerial effort (both formal, in the form of R&D, and informal).
As the industrial sector grows more complex and sophisticated, the challenge of providing better and
more appropriate human capital becomes more important. In the process, relevant institutions
develop and firms become more conscious of the need for skill development and training. However,
given the complexity of the information involved, the long-term nature of skill investment and the
inherent externalities, purely market-driven sources may fail to keep up with skill needs. At low
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and quality of primary schooling and basic technical education, and encouraging all firm training. At
higher levels, there has to be greater emphasis of high-level, specialized training, with close
interaction between education and production. This is a more difficult process, and many developed
economies worry about the quality and content of their educational structures.
Table 2 shows educational patterns in the Tigers and other countries. Formal education is not the
ideal way to measure skill creation: on-the-job learning and training are often more important.
Enrolment data may not be a sound indicator even of formal education: dropout rates differ across
countries. Moreover, the quality and relevance of the education system for modern needs differ
greatly by country. Nevertheless, enrolment data are available on a comparable basis, and the rates
say something about the base for skill acquisition.














107 68 19 (c)
Korea 95 99 55
Taiwan 100 88 38
China 118 55 4
Indonesia 115 45 10
Malaysia 93 61 10
Thailand 87 49 21
Philippines 111 80 27
India 103 49 6




Sri Lanka 105 75 6
Turkey 97 64 20
Latin America
Argentina 111 67 36
Brazil 114 46 11
Chile 99 68 27
Colombia 117 55 10
Mexico 112 58 14
Africa
Egypt 100 80 17
Ghana 76 37 1
Kenya 91 25 2QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 14
Mauritius 106 54 4
Morocco 69 28 10




Tanzania 68 5 0
Tunisia 117 43 11
Uganda 71 13 1





Hungary 95 81 17
Poland 98 84 22
OECD
Japan 102 98 29
France 105 106 50
Germany 97 101 36
UK 114 94 41
USA 107 97 81
Sources: World Development
Report 1996, 1997. UNESCO,
Statistical Yearbook 1995.
Primary education is almost universal in all the Tigers and new Tigers, and there is relatively little to
differentiate between countries at least according to official enrolment figures. Secondary enrolment
rates are very high in the Tigers, with Korea and Taiwan at developed country levels. Hong Kong
and Singapore are slightly behind, followed by Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. However, there
are reasons to differentiate between school education in terms of quality. Educational quality is
always very difficult to judge, and the best we can do is to look at indirect proxies. In terms of
dropout/completion rates, the Tigers perform far better than other countries; Sub-Saharan Africa is
particularly weak in these terms, as are parts of South Asia. In terms of facilities and relevance of
curricula to technical needs, the East Asians also do much better.
Korea and Taiwan have tertiary enrolments at developed country levels, followed by Hong Kong
and Singapore. Singapore has very large enrolments in polytechnics, reflecting its strategy of
concentrating on production-related skills for technologically advanced activities. If we include these
with universities Singapore’s total tertiary enrolments reach 46%, near Korean levels.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 15
Table 3: Tertiary Enrolments in Technical Fields (most recent year)
Country Natural Science Maths/Computing Engineering  'Core' Tech. (a) All Tech. (b)
Number % pop. Number % pop. Number % pop. Number % pop. Number % pop.
Africa
Egypt 26,602 0.04% 2,333 0.00% 44,545 0.07% 73,480 0.12% 158,111 0.26%
Ghana 1,179 0.01 227 0.00 712 0.00 2,118 0.01 3,317 0.02
Kenya 3,598 0.02 0 0.00 1,046 0.00 4,644 0.02 7,168 0.03
Mauritius 86 0.01% 130 0.01% 269 0.02% 485 0.04% 737 0.07%
Morocco 71,143 0.27% ./. .. 1,051 0.00% 72,194 0.28% 81,037 0.31%
Nigeria 29,526 0.03% ./. .. 15,085 0.01% 44,611 0.04% 63,978 0.06%
South Africa 21,693 0.07 30,498 0.10 19,958 0.06 72,149 0.23 97,729 0.32
Tanzania 180 0.00% 13 0.00% 664 0.00% 31,441 0.00% 1,096 0.00%
Tunisia 11,520 0.13% 2,213 0.03% 7,233 0.08% 20,966 0.24% 31,441 0.37%
Uganda 940 0.00% 268 0.00% 1,474 0.01% 2,682 0.01% 3,621 0.02%
Zimbabwe 1,799 0.02 399 0.00 4,718 0.04 6,916 0.06 9,271 0.08
Asia
Bangladesh 75,503 0.07 7,523 0.01 5,830 0.01 88,856 0.08 96,793 0.09





Hong Kong 5,503 0.09% 6,441 0.11% 14,788 0.25% 26,732 0.46% 35,068 0.60%
India 869,119 0.10 ./. .. 216,837 0.02 1,085,95
6
0.12 1,236,414 0.14
Indonesia 22,394 0.01 13,117 0.01 205,086 0.11 240,597 0.13 315,325 0.17
Korea 81,222 0.18 171,147 0.38 437,537 0.98 689,906 1.55 730,346 1.64
Malaysia 8,776 0.05 4,557 0.02 12,693 0.07 26,026 0.14 32,222 0.17
Pakistan 29,433 0.03 ./. .. 41,244 0.04 70,677 0.06 75,168 0.06
Philippines 17,444 0.03 5,609 0.01 201,701 0.29 224,754 0.33 510,525 0.74
Singapore (c) 1,281 0.05 1,420 0.05 13,029 0.47 15,730 0.56 16,767 0.60
Sri Lanka 8,198 0.05 148 0.00 3,865 0.02 12,211 0.07 18,722 0.10
Taiwan 16,823 0.08 32,757 0.16 179,094 0.86 228,674 1.09 303,964 1.45
Thailand 77,098 0.14 1,292 0.00 105,149 0.19 183,539 0.32 249,952 0.44
Turkey 39,327 0.07 25,276 0.04 134,408 0.24 199,011 0.35 339,004 0.60
Latin America
Argentina 69,727 0.21 ./. .. 96,205 0.29 165,932 0.49 295,936 0.88
Brazil 46,322 0.03 92,701 0.06 149,660 0.10 288,683 0.19 487,967 0.33
Chile 8,577 0.06 ./. .. 85,483 0.61 94,060 0.67 134,263 0.96
Colombia 261 0.00% 9,520 0.03% 117,941 0.35% 127,722 0.38% 185,407 0.55%
Mexico 42,457 0.05 97,575 0.01% 221,867 0.27 361,899 0.45 518,396 0.64
East Europe
Czech Rep. 2,600 0.03 3,299 0.03 36,847 0.36 42,746 0.42 56,342 0.55
Hungary 1,766 0.02 1,588 0.02 10,614 0.10 13,968 0.14 41,718 0.41
Poland 19,047 0.05 12,819 0.03 119,912 0.31 151,778 0.40 213,761 0.56QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 16
Industrialised
Japan 59,030 0.05 20,891 0.02 488,699 0.39 568,620 0.46 730,637 0.59
France 304,093 0.53 ./. .. 50,845 0.09 354,938 0.62 614,159 1.07
Germany 310,435 0.39 ./. .. 389,182 0.49 699,617 0.88 805,801 1.01
Israel 7,972 0.16 6,144 0.12 23,207 0.46 37,323 0.74 45,780 0.91
Italy 93,761 0.16 64,099 0.11 200,749 0.35 358,609 0.63 610,642 1.07
Spain 82,751 0.21 65,807 0.17 176,702 0.45 325,260 0.82 473,159 1.20
Sweden 9,076 0.10 13,452 0.16 37,324 0.43 59,852 0.69 141,258 1.63
Switzerland 11,396 0.16 2,950 0.04 22,217 0.31 36,563 0.52 57,041 0.81
UK 105,983 0.18 76,430 0.13 219,078 0.38 401,491 0.69 596,404 1.03
USA 496,415 0.19 525,067 0.20 801,126 0.31 1,822,60
8
0.70 3,676,985 1.41
Notes: (a) 'Core' technical subjects are natural science, math’s and computing and engineering.
(b) 'All technical' subjects include core technical plus medicine, architecture, trade and crafts, and transport and
communications.
(c) Singapore's tertiary enrolment figures exclude polytechnics, which enrol 27% of the age group. If these are
counted as tertiary institutions, this would greatly increase all its tertiary enrolment figures.
The breakdown of tertiary enrolments in technical subjects is probably more relevant than
general enrolment for assessing capabilities to absorb technological knowledge. The data (Table 3)
show much higher differences between countries than general enrolments (note that the figures are
now expressed as percentages of the total population rather than of the relevant age group). The
most relevant indicator of skills related to industrial technology is enrolments in ‘core’ technical
subjects (natural science, mathematics, computing and engineering).
In Asia, Korea and Taiwan are now ahead of the technological leaders in the OECD, taking first
and second places in the ranking. Singapore comes just after France, with Hong Kong coming two
places later, after Argentina. The ranking of the Tigers matches the general intensity of their policy
interventions to develop their technological capabilities. At the other extreme, Sub-Saharan Africa
(except for South Africa) hovers below 0.02%, with Zimbabwe standing out at 0.06%.
4.2.5 Stimulating Technological Activity
All developing countries are highly dependent on imported technologies. However, they undertake a
lot of technological activity themselves, to absorb, adapt and improve upon imported knowledge.
Such activity is difficult to measure — it takes place at all levels of the firm and cannot be separated
from production, engineering, quality control, procurement, design and so on — and so cannot be
compared across countries. What can be compared is formal R&D (Table 4).
While R&D does not capture the full extent of technological activity, it is still a useful indicator of
technological effort. Its relevance rises as countries mature industrially: basic technological
capabilities are then more standardised, and formal R&D is a more accurate measure of differences
technological effort. Note that R&D does not mean that countries are on technological frontiers:
R&D can be used for absorbing and monitoring technologies as much as for ‘innovating’, and being
a follower in innovation is a very respectable way of keeping up with new technologies.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 17
R&D financed by industry is generally regarded a better indicator of directly productive
technological effort. Korea leads the world with 2.27% of GDP, a direct consequence of its strategy
of creating chaebol and pushing them into export markets. This R&D is highly concentrated: the 20
top spenders account for some 65% of the total. Korea is followed by Japan and the OECD
technological leaders, with Taiwan as the next developing country in 11th place; unlike Korea, more
than half of Taiwanese R&D is financed by the government because of the large presence of SMEs.
Singapore, at 20th place, is the next developing country on the list.
R&D propensities diverge widely in the developing world, and the ranking (at least at the top) is
very similar to that yielded by the skill figures. Korea and Taiwan lead the developing world, the
former by a large margin, followed by Singapore and then other countries. Hong Kong does not
figure in R&D, with the total only coming to 0.1% of GDP (the industry-financed figure is not
available but is likely to be very low as well). At the very bottom are some large African and Asian
countries (the smaller African countries do not even have R&D data). So, surprisingly, are most of
the new Tigers, highlighting the very low technological content of their industrial activity. This has not
held back their past export growth, but is likely to become a constraint in the future as their main
competitive advantage, in low cost assembly, is challenged by newer entrants.
The most interesting lessons for technological development thus come from the three mature
Tigers. How did they stimulate technological activity? Take them in turn.
Korea: The Korean government supported technological effort directly in several ways. Private
R&D was directly promoted by a incentives and other forms of assistance. There were a number of
direct incentives. These included tax exempt TDR (Technology Development Reserve) funds,
which were subject to punitive taxes if not used within a specified period. The TDR funds could,
however, be used for investment in the first venture capital fund (Korea Technology Development
Corporation, launched with World Bank assistance) and in collaborative R&D with public research
institutes. The government also gave tax credits for 125% of R&D expenditures as well as for
upgrading human capital related to research and setting up industry research institutes, accelerated
depreciation for investments in R&D facilities and a tax exemption for 10 percent of cost of relevant
equipment. It reduced import duties for imported research equipment, and cut excise tax on
technology-intensive products. The KTAC (Korea Technology Advancement Corporation) was set
up to help firms to commercialise research results; a 6 percent tax credit or special accelerated
depreciation provided further incentives.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 18
Table 4: R&D Expenditures (by region)




















Developing Countries Industrial and East European Countries
Hong
Kong
1995 0.1 N/A 23.0 USA 1996 2.5 1.50 674.5
Singapore 1994 1.1 0.69 294.0 Canada 1996 1.6 0.77 310.1
Korea 1995 2.7 2.27 261.9 Japan 1995 3.0 2.01 1189.2
Taiwan 1994 1.8 1.00 198.0 Austria 1996 1.5 0.66 404.7
China 1993 0.6 0.11 3.7 Belgium 1993 1.6 1.01 395.4
Indonesia 1993 0.2 0.04 2.0 Denmark 1995 1.8 0.90 538.0
Malaysia 1992 0.4 0.17 15.6 Finland 1995 2.3 1.31 473.3
Philippines 1984 0.1 0.02 1.1 France 1995 2.3 1.13 574.8
Thailand 1991 0.2 0.02 5.5 Germany 1996 2.3 1.40 632.7
India 1995 1.1 0.14 3.7 Greece 1993 0.5 0.10 41.1
Pakistan 1990 0.3 0.00 0.8 Iceland 1996 1.5 0.48 374.3
Sri Lanka 1994 0.2 0.02 1.4 Ireland 1995 1.4 0.94 205.9
Argentina 1996 0.3 0.05 24.1 Italy 1996 1.1 0.54 209.2
Brazil 1985 0.4 0.08 14.6 Netherlands 1994 2.0 0.90 480.0
Chile 1994 0.8 0.16 38.6 Norway 1995 1.6 0.71 500.0
Colombia 1982 0.1 N/A 1.9 Portugal 1995 0.6 0.11 58.4
Mexico 1995 0.4 0.09 13.3 Spain 1996 0.8 0.32 108.6
Peru 1984 0.2 0.05 4.6 Sweden 1995 3.0 1.89 712.5
Venezuela 1992 0.5 0.00 15.1 Switzerland 1992 2.7 1.82 1097.0
Egypt 1991 1.0 N/A 6.0 UK 1995 2.1 1.01 392.7
Turkey 1995 0.4 0.12 11.1 Australia 1994 1.6 0.73 299.5
Tunisia 1992 0.3 N/A 5.5 New
Zealand
1993 1.0 0.34 143.4
Israel 1990 2.1 0.82 334.3 Total
OECD
1995 2.2 1.30 ..
Jordan 1986 0.3 N/A 4.5 N. America 1995 2.3 1.35 ..
Nigeria 1987 0.1 0.00 0.3 Czech Rep. 1995 1.2 0.76 29.4
South
Africa
1991 1.0 0.50 31.6 Hungary 1995 0.8 0.34 33.0
Mauritius 1992 0.4 0.01 13.5 Poland 1995 0.7 0.22 19.5
Sources: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1995; national sources. OECD, Main Science and Technology
Indicators, 1997, 1. US N.S.F., Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996.
(a) R&D financed by productive enterprises (UNESCO), or by industry (OECD) as % of GNP.
(b)  Last available total R&D as % of 1995 income ($) using income figures from World Development Report
1997.
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The import of technology was promoted by further tax incentives: transfer costs of patent rights and
technology import fees were tax deductible; income from technology consulting was tax-exempt;
and foreign engineers were exempt from income tax. In addition, the government gave grants and
long term low interest loans to participants in ‘National Projects’, which gave tax privileges and
official funds to private and government R&D institutes to carry out these projects. The Korea
Technology Development Corporation provided technology finance. However, the main stimulus to
industrial R&D in Korea came less from specific incentives than from the overall strategy that
created large firms, gave them finance and protected markets, minimised their reliance on FDI, and
forced them into export markets. This is why, for instance, why Korea now has 25 times higher
R&D by industry as a proportion of GDP than Mexico which has roughly the same size of
manufacturing value added but has remained highly dependent on technology imports.
Taiwan: While the growth of Taiwanese R&D has some similarities to Korea, there are important
structural differences. The Taiwanese government has a more arm’s length relationship with industry
and did not promote the growth of large private conglomerates. It started to promote the
development of local R&D capabilities in the late 1950s, when its growing trade dependence
reinforced the need to enhance local innovative effort to upgrade and diversify its exports. A Science
and Technology Program was started in 1979, targeting energy, production automation, information
science and materials science technologies for development. In 1982, biotechnology, electro-optics,
hepatitis control and food technology were added to this list. The S&T Development Plan (1986-
95) continued strategic technology targeting, aiming at total R&D of 2 percent of GDP for 1995; it
did not quite achieve this — it reached 1.8 percent by that year.
Around half of R&D in Taiwan is financed by the government, though the contribution has come
down over time. Private sector R&D has been weak relative to Korea because of the
preponderance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which cannot afford the large minimum
investments involved in much of industrial research. However, enterprise R&D has risen over time as
some local firms have grown and (like Acer and Tatung) become significant multinationals. Such
R&D has been encouraged over the years by a variety of incentives: provision of funds for venture
capital; financing for enterprises that developed ‘strategic’ industrial products (of which 151 were
selected in 1982 and 214 in 1987); measures to encourage product development by private firms by
providing matching interest-free loans and up to 25 percent of grants for approved projects; full tax
deductibility for R&D expenses, with accelerated depreciation for research equipment; special
incentives for enterprises based in the Hsinchu Science Park (with government financial institutions
able to invest up to 49 percent of the capital); and requiring larger firms to invest (0.5-1.5 percent of
sales, depending on the activity) on R&D. The government also launched large-scale research
consortia, funded jointly with industry, to develop critical products such as a new generation
automobile engine, 16M DRAM and 4M SRAM chips.
Singapore: The Singapore government launched a S$2 billion five year technology plan in 1991. A
number of sectors (information technology, microelectronics, electronic systems, materials
technology, advanced manufacturing technology, energy and water resources, environment,
biotechnology, food/agrotechnology and medical sciences) were selected for development. An
R&D target of 2% of GDP by 1995 was set; as with Taiwan, however, the target was not met (in
Singapore’s case by a larger margin). The new science and technology plan, launched in 1997,
doubled S&T expenditures, to S$4 billion over 5 years, of which 30% is directed to strategic
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There are several schemes to promote R&D by the private sector. The Research Incentive Scheme
for Companies (RISC) gives grants to set up ‘Centres of Excellence’ in strategic technologies, and is
open to all companies. The R&D Assistance Scheme (RDAS) gives grants for specific product and
process research that promotes enterprise competitiveness, and is also open to all companies. The
Cooperative Research Program gives grants to local enterprises (at least 30% local equity) to
develop their technological capabilities by working together with universities and research
institutions. The National Science and Technology Board initiates research consortia to allow
companies and research institutes to pool their resources for R&D, and five consortia are already in
existence (on marine technology, aerospace, enterprise security architecture, digital media and
advanced packaging). The Innovation Development Scheme (IDS) provides a 50 percent grant to
all promising innovation projects; the latest round provided S$130 million to 90 companies, local
and foreign, in April, 1997. According to the government, these schemes have succeeded in raising
the share of private R&D to 65% of the total. The Singapore government also plays a catalytic role
in promoting selected technologies.
4.2.6 Financing Technological Investments
This section is not concerned with financial interventions in general but with the ability to finance
investments in technology development. Such ability becomes increasingly important at higher levels
of economic development. At low levels of industrialization, when firms are small and using 'easy'
technologies, with low capital requirements and limited possibilities of improvements, specialised
technology finance is not an important consideration. Working capital covers most technology
development activities (production engineering, quality improvement and productivity improvement);
though even here there is a risk that sufficient financing will not be available to small firms without
proper collateral. As development proceeds, the financing gap may be more serious. Enterprises
need to undertake long-term and risky investments in new technologies, and new technology-based
start-ups, without a track record, need to raise initial risk capital. The normal financial system is
generally unable to finance such investments; large firms can cross-subsidise their R&D activity while
smaller ones have to depend on internal or family sources. All the well-known capital market failures
in developing countries apply with even more force to technological investments, since the capacity
to assess risk and the willingness to undertake it add to the usual problems of asymmetric
information and moral hazard.
Korea: Korea’s policies to encourage activities and firms via credit allocation and subsidisation
were inherent to its industrial policy from the start (World Bank, 1993). As the industrial sector
matured and entered more demanding areas of technology and the government reduced the direct
allocation of credit, its role in technology financing increased rather than decreased. This was also
aided by the fact that the emerging ‘rules of the game’ made other forms of subsidies and grants to
industry unacceptable, while technology financing remained a permissible form of intervention. The
government provided technology financing in the form of both grants and loans (often directed and
subsidised). A variety of institutions, like venture capital companies, banks, credit guarantee
companies and others were used to channel funds to a variety of users in a variety of forms.
The scale of technology financing in Korea was truly impressive, though the government feels that it
is still inadequate for its needs. This accounts for the constant setting up of new schemes, targeted at
smaller firms and the fostering of collaboration with research institutes. The figures also indicate that
there is tremendous technological dynamism in the SME sector, though the chaebol continue toQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 21
account for the bulk of R&D expenditures. The extent of selectivity in technological activity remains
very high, with no remission in the strategy of identifying and targeting specific areas for research
activity. It is not possible to evaluate how effective the various schemes have been in stimulating new
research or how well the targeting has worked. Some of the financing may well have been wasteful,
and university and research institute linkages with industry remain weak and could be further
strengthened (Kim, 1996). However, it is likely that the schemes have generated several
commercially useful technologies and led to valuable spillovers and linkages among the actors. The
research institutions may also have created a lot of useful learning on research techniques that fed
into private sector R&D.
Taiwan: Taiwan has also developed a comprehensive system for financing technology activity. In
the early 1980s, the government felt the financial system was failing to meet the need of technology-
based enterprises. It set up a capital investment fund of NT$ 800 million in 1983, which it
augmented in 1991 by a second fund of NT$ 1.6 billion. By mid-1993 it had 23 venture capital
companies, which had invested some NT$ 9 billion (US$ 340 million) in nearly 400 companies in
high technology industries (nearly half the funds went into two activities, information and electronics).
4.2.7 Technology Infrastructure and SME Support
The technology infrastructure consists of four sets of institutions. The MSTQ structure (consisting of
metrology, standards, testing and quality institutions) provides the basic ‘language’ and measures of
all technological activity. Public, private and collaborative R&D institutions conduct basic, applied
and contract research. The university and technical college system does basic research as well as
applied work for industry. Technical extension services help small and medium enterprises. Some
countries also have institutions to provide information on foreign sources of technology, help firms to
match-make with potential technology suppliers, commercialise technologies developed in public
research bodies, stimulate innovation networks and promote new entrepreneurs.
This is in addition to the physical infrastructure that supports R&D — science parks, technology
cities and the like — and the institutions that provide the human capital for technology. A significant
part of the knowledge infrastructure is intended to provide the ‘public goods’ of technological
activity, such as standards, information, extension or basic research. Some fills in for the private
sector until sufficient capabilities have developed to undertake the activity. And some substitutes for
private services. In general, these institutions are a country’s ‘antenna’ on knowledge creation in the
world, monitoring trends, translating them to practical local use, training people in their use, creating
new technologies and diffusing information to enterprises and researchers.
Unfortunately, the reality of public technology institutions in developing countries tends to be very
different. Many institutions do not support productive technological activity. Research bodies are
generally delinked from the sectors they are to serve, doing basic research of poor quality and no
practical use. Many are out of touch with international trends, have outdated equipment and libraries
and employ underpaid, badly managed and unmotivated personnel. Even service providers like
extension or quality bodies tend to be badly staffed and managed, and do little to help their
prospective clients. Universities do little research, and cannot link what they do to what enterprises
need. As a consequence, in most developing countries enterprises have little regard, and even less
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knowledge infrastructure is undeniable. The technological leaders in Asia have invested heavily in
improving their infrastructure institutions, as the following examples illustrate.
Korea: The Korean government set up a large array of technology infrastructure institutions. In 1966
it launched KIST (Korea Institute of Science and Technology) to conduct applied research for
industry. In early years, KIST focused on solving problems of technology transfer and absorption. In
the 1970s, the government set up other specialised research institutes related to machinery, metals,
electronics, nuclear energy, resources, chemicals, telecommunications, standards, shipbuilding,
marine sciences, and so on. These were largely spun off from KIST, and by the end of the decade
there were 16 public R&D institutions. In 1981 the government decided to reduce their number and
rationalise their operations. The existing institutes were merged into 9 under the supervision of the
Ministry of Science and Technology. KIST was merged with KAIS (Korea Advanced Institute of
Science) to become KAIST, but was separated again — as KIST — in 1989.
The government’s strategic thrust in this sphere was mainly a series of National R&D Projects
launched in 1982. These were large-scale projects regarded as too risky for industry to tackle alone
but considered in the country’s industrial interest. National Projects were conducted jointly by
industry, public research institutes and the government, and covered activities like semiconductors,
computers, fine chemicals, machinery, material science and plant system engineering. ‘Centres of
Excellence’ were set up to boost long-term competitiveness in these fields. National Projects were a
continuation of policies to identify and develop Korea’s dynamic comparative advantage,
orchestrating the different actors involved, underwriting a part of the risks, providing large financial
grants, and filling in gaps that the market could not remedy.
Since the early 1980s a number of laws were passed to promote SMEs, leading to a perceptible
rise in their share of economic activity (over 1975-86 the share of SMEs in employment, sales and
value added rose by at least 25 per cent). This policy support was crucial to the reversal in their
performance: it covered SME start-up, productivity improvement, technology development and
export promotion. A host of tax incentives was provided to firms participating in these programs, as
well as finance at subsidised rates for using support services, credit guarantees, government
procurement and the setting up of a specialised bank to finance SMEs. A number of other
institutions were set up to help SMEs (such as the Small and Medium Industry Promotion
Corporation to provide financial, technical and training assistance and the Industrial Development
Bank to provide finance). The government greatly increased its own budget contribution to the
program, though SMEs had to pay a part of the costs of most services provided to them.
To promote subcontracting to SMEs, the government enacted a law designating parts and
components that had to be procured through them and not made in-house by large firms. By 1987
about 1200 items were so designated, involving 337 principal firms and some 2200 subcontractors,
mainly in the machinery, electrical, electronic and shipbuilding fields. By this time, subcontracting
accounted for about 43% of manufacturing output and 65-77% of the output values of the electrical,
transport equipment and other machinery industries. Generous financial and fiscal support was
provided to subcontracting SMEs to support their operations and technology. Subcontracting SMEs
were exempted from stamp tax and were granted tax deductions for a certain percentage of their
investments in laboratory/inspection equipment and for all their expenses on technical consultancy.
Subcontracting promotion councils were set up by industry and within the Korea Federation of
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Taiwan: Taiwan’s technology infrastructure for supporting its SMEs is comprehensive and well
funded. In 1981, the government set up the Medium and Small Business Administration to support
SME development and co-ordinate the several agencies that provided financial, management,
accounting, technological and marketing assistance to SMEs. Financial assistance was provided by
the Taiwan Medium Business Bank, the Bank of Taiwan, the Small and Medium Business Credit
Guarantee Fund, and the Small Business Integrated Assistance Center. Management and technology
assistance was provided by the China Productivity Center, the Industrial Technology Research
Institute (ITRI) and a number of industrial technology centers (for metal industry, textiles,
biotechnology, food, and information). The government covered up to 50-70 percent of consultation
fees for management and technical consultancy services for SMEs.  The Medium and Small
Business Administration established a fund for SME promotion of NT$ 10 billion. The “Center-
Satellite Factory Promotion Program” integrated smaller factories around a principal one, supported
by vendor assistance and productivity raising efforts. By 1989 there were 60 networks with 1,186
satellite factories in operation, mainly in the electronics industry.
Several technology research institutes support R&D in the private sector. The China Textile
Research Center, set up in 1959 to inspect exports, was expanded to include training, quality
systems, technology development and directly acquiring foreign technology. The Metal Industries
Development Center was set up in 1963 to work on practical development, testing and quality
control work in metal-working industries. It later established a CAD/CAM center to provide training
and software to firms in this industry. The Precision Instrument Development Center fabricated
instruments and promoted the instrument manufacturing industry, and later moved into advanced
areas like vacuum and electro-optics technology.
The most important center was the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). ITRI
conducted R&D for technology projects considered too risky by the private sector. It had seven
laboratories, dealing with chemicals, mechanical industries, electronics, energy and mining, materials
research, measurement standards and electro-optics, but electronics was the institute's principal
focus, with its Electronics Research & Service (ERSO) division accounting for two-thirds of the
Institute's $450 million budget. ERSO has spun off laboratories as private companies including
United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) in 1979 and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company (TSMC) in 1986, Taiwan's most successful integrated circuit makers. The Institute for the
Information Industry (III) was set up to complement ITRI’s work on hardware by developing and
introducing software technology.
The government also occasionally played a lead role in importing very advanced technologies. It
entered into a joint venture with Philips to set up the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company, the first wafer fabrication plant in the country (today one of the leaders in the world). The
government strongly encouraged industry to contract research to universities, and half of the
National Science Council’s research grants (about $200 million per year) provided matching funds
to industry for such contracts. The Program for the Promotion of Technology Transfer maintained
close contact with foreign firms with leading-edge technologies in order to facilitate the transfer of
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The China Productivity Center (CPC) promoted automation in industry to cope with rising wages
and increasing needs for precision and quality. The CPC sent out teams of engineers to visit plants
throughout the country and demonstrate the best means of automation and solve relevant technical
problems, at the rate of approximately 500 visits making some 2000 suggestions per year. CPC also
carried out more than 500 research projects on improving production efficiency and linked
enterprises to research centers to solve more complex technical problems. The government set up a
science town in Hsinchu, with 13,000 researchers in two universities, six national laboratories
(including ITRI) and a huge technology institute, as well as some 150 companies specializing in
electronics. The science town makes special effort to attract start-ups and provides them with
prefabricated factory space, five-year tax holidays and generous grants.
Singapore: Singapore is renowned for its infrastructure in technology as well as in other fields. Here
we consider only its support for SMEs. In 1962 the Economic Development Board (EDB) launched
a program to help SMEs modernise their equipment with funds provided by the UNDP. In the mid-
1970s several other schemes for financial assistance were added; of these, the most significant was
the Small Industries Finance Scheme to encourage technological upgrading. The 1985 recession
induced the government to launch stronger measures, and the Venture Capital Fund was set up to
help SMEs acquire capital through low interest loans and equity. A Small Enterprises Bureau was
established in 1986 to act as a one-stop consultancy agency; this helped SMEs with management
and training, finance and grants, and co-ordinating assistance from other agencies. In 1987, a US$
519 m. scheme was launched to cover eight programs to help SMEs, including product
development assistance, technical assistance to import foreign consultancy, venture capital to help
technology start-ups, robot leasing, training, and technology tie-ups with foreign companies.
In addition, the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research (SISIR) disseminated
technology to SMEs, and helped their exports by providing information on foreign technical
requirements and how to meet them. The National Productivity Board provided management advice
and consultancy to SMEs. The Technology Development Centre helped local firms to identify their
technology requirements and purchase technologies; it also designed technology-upgrading
strategies. Since its foundation in 1989, the TDC provided over 130 firms with various forms of
technical assistance. It also administered the Small Industry Technical Assistance Scheme (SITAS)
and Product Development Assistance Scheme to help firms develop their design and development
capabilities. It gave grants of over $1 million for 29 SITAS in the past 5 years, mainly to local
enterprises. Its earnings have risen to a level where its cost-recoverable activities are self financing.
The EDB encouraged subcontracting to local firms through its Local Industries Upgrading Program
(LIUP), under which MNCs were encouraged to source components locally by ‘adopting’
particular SMEs as subcontractors. In return for a commitment by the MNCs to provide on the job
training and technical assistance to subcontractors, the government provided a package of assistance
to the latter, including cost sharing grants and loans for the purchase of equipment or consultancy
and the provision of training. By end-1990, 27 MNCs and 116 SMEs had joined this program.
Over 1976-88, the total value of financial assistance by the Singapore government to SMEs
amounted to S$ 1.5 billion, of which 88% was in the Small Industries Financing Scheme. Grants of
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4.2.8 Export Promotion
New exporters, especially smaller ones, invariably face high costs in obtaining information on export
markets: a major barrier to the development of competitive capabilities. The Tigers have invested
heavily in overcoming this deficiency.
In Korea, in particular, the promotion system became a compelling means of forcing firms into
export activity. Exports targets were set at the industry, product and firm levels (Rhee et al., 1984)
by firms and industry associations in concert with the government. There were monthly meetings
between top government officials (chaired by the President) and leading exporters. Targets were
also enforced by denying access to subsidised credit and import licences to poor performers, and
subjecting them to severe tax audits. Successful exporters were given continued access to credit and
licenses, and rewarded with perfunctory audits, publicity and prizes. Bureaucrats were also held
responsible for meeting export targets in their respective industries, and had to keep in close touch
with enterprises and markets. There regular studies of each major export industry, with information
on world market conditions, competitors, technological trends, and so on. The selectivity of these
promotion measures mirrored those used to promote infant industries.
Korea set up trading houses (owned by the chaebol) on the Japanese model, with preferential loans
from the government for stocking products and preferential ceilings on foreign exchange holdings
overseas. By 1976 there were 11 general trading houses that met the criteria set in terms of export
volumes, paid-up capital and number of overseas branches. By 1982 they accounted for about half
of Korean exports, with an average of 23 offices overseas (Rhee et al., 1984, p. 53). The initial
heavy reliance on foreign buyers was reduced as local marketing capabilities were built up. Today,
the chaebol have a massive international presence in practically all foreign markets and are investing
enormous sums in building up an ‘image’.
2
Taiwanese exporters were given preferential tax treatment and access to credit on favourable terms
(above). According to Wade (1990), they were encouraged to form cartels and provided with
quality assistance, marketing information and prizes. Local enterprises, predominantly SMEs, led the
export drive, first by using the “Chinese connection” in Asia and then, as their horizons widened, by
tapping Japanese trading companies and American mass-market buyers. In the 1960s, about 60%
of textile exports were sold through Japanese sogo shosha, and even today these companies handle
a third to half of Taiwanese exports. US buyers grew more important over time, with the
government facilitating contacts with small suppliers, with aggressive assistance from industry
associations and other private organisations. In addition, there also emerged large numbers of
relatively small local trading houses, which proved valuable sources of technical, design and
marketing information to Taiwanese exporters.In general, however, there was considerably less
selectivity in promoting exports in Taiwan than in Korea; in particular, there was no targeting of
specific products, industries or firms. While the Taiwanese government gave strong general incentive
for its firms to go multinational and relocate uncompetitive facilities overseas, these were more
functional than selective in nature.
                                                
2 At the same time, the chaebol used their technological strengths to sell OEM products (mainly in the electronics
industry) to the world’s leading innovative MNCs. OEM contracts proved a valuable means of accessing new technology, in
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An important institutional tool in all the Tigers was the establishment of trade promotion centres.
The Hong Kong Trade Development Council is highly regarded for its ‘matchmaking’ between
foreign buyers and exporters. Taiwan’s China External Trade Development Council (CETDC) is,
however, perhaps the most effective. The Singapore Trade Development Board (SRDB) started
later and was doing extremely well within five years; again, its scope is fairly limited because over 80
per cent of manufactured exports are from MNC affiliates that do not need such assistance. The
Korean Trade Promotion Council (KOTRA) was modelled upon the Japan External Trade
Research Organisation; it is regarded as less effective than its Hong Kong and Taiwanese
counterparts. Most Korean exports are handled by its giant trading companies that buy from smaller
enterprises, or else emanate directly from the chaebol.
The main contribution of these organisations has been to help SMEs establish contacts with foreign
buyers and break directly into new markets. They are highly skilled and professional. For instance,
in the first three organisations “most of the officials …. come from overseas-Chinese communities
that are business-oriented in the extreme and highly sophisticated in international trade. Many of their
higher officials have MBAs, postgraduate degrees in practical fields such as engineering or design, or
substantial previous business experience. Most have degrees from first-rate universities. Each gives
its staff excellent training”.
3 All four have large computerised information bases, and actively help
enterprises in establishing contact, participating in trade fairs and missions, conducting research and
often providing industrial and packaging assistance.
5. Limitations to Selective Industrial and Trade Policies
5.1 Limitations to Selective Interventions
While it is easy to establish a theoretical case for interventions to promote industry, and to show that
it was effective in some countries, this does not prove that it will work in practice in all countries. It is
vital to bear in mind the risk of government failure. The history of development is replete with
failed policies; the current liberalisation is partly a reflection of such failure. By the same token, the
failure of some interventions does not mean that all interventions are undesirable. As long as market
failures exist, wholesale reliance on free markets has costs, and it may be desirable to see how
government failures can be overcome. Any industrial policy must include a consideration of which
interventions suit its government capabilities and how such capabilities can be improved. The main
constraints to selective policies are as follows.
Lack of Clarity of Objectives: Governments often have unclear or conflicting objectives in their
economic and trade policies, making it difficult to implement interventions that call for a strong,
unambiguous pursuit of efficiency. ‘Leaving it to the market’ has the advantage that is imposes a
clear set of priorities on policy makers and is easily understood by the actors. Clarity of objectives is
                                                
3 Keesing (1988), pp. 9-10. Most institutions have substantial government financial support. The Singapore agency is fully
funded by the government. The Korean one gets 70% of its funds from the government, the remainder from a levy on
imports. That in Hong Kong is financed by an ad valorem levy on domestic exports and imports. The Taiwanese agency is
funded by a fixed donation by exporters based on the value of exports. KOTRA had a staff of 933 in 1988, STDB of 350,
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a matter of political leadership rather than economic analysis, and its nature varies with the country’s
political system and over time.
4
Information problems: A government using industrial policy needs information on technologies,
markets, local capabilities and institutions. The failures that afflict markets in optimising resource
allocation also affect governments. The government may not have access to better information than
firms; in fact, at the detailed level of products, markets and technologies it is very unlikely to do so.
However, the government is better placed than individual agents to tackle co-ordination problems
and externalities (Stiglitz, 1994). Moreover, it is possible to over-stress information problems
involved in ‘picking winners’ at the industry level. Neoclassical economists, in their quest for unique
equilibrium solutions, cannot conceive how governments can ever optimise (overlooking the
problems that private agents face in this respect). The issue facing governments is not, however, to
solve a gigantic optimisation problem. Given the possibilities of multiple equilibria, they have to
decide upon which path they set the economy upon, not to calculate in detail the costs and benefits
of different outcomes. Stiglitz (1966) notes “Good decision-making by the government necessarily
involves making mistakes: a policy that supported only sure winners would have taken no risks. The
relatively few mistakes speak well of the government’s ability to pick winners” (p.162).
Developing countries choose technologies that are established elsewhere and, with some effort, they
can obtain full information on the parameters involved. This is much easier than picking winners at
the frontiers of innovation, the problem in advanced industrial countries. It does not matter very
much which particular activity countries choose to promote between a reasonable range of
technological choices. A coherent and integrated series of interventions can create winners, just
what the interventionist Tigers did. Each defined a set of favoured activities (within a strategic
framework), then mobilised factor and product markets with appropriate interventions to guide
enterprises and industries. To offset some dangers of intervention, they imposed export discipline.
Mistakes were made, as with private investments, but flexible and rapid response ensured that the
costs were kept down.
This does not mean that any set of activities would have worked equally well. The choices have, as
noted, to be ‘reasonable’, but what does this mean? Given the incremental and cumulative nature of
technological learning, the activities had to rely on the existing base of skills and capabilities and the
rate at which these could be increased. The technologies developed had to have commercial
applications, and the private sector that was to use them had to have the financial wherewithal to
mount the necessary investments. The main demands were organisational rather than informational.
The mistake of import substituting governments was to ignore efficiency and international markets,
and to assume away capability problems. In effect, they believed that the necessary capabilities
existed within the country, or would be created automatically and without extra cost.
                                                
4 The Tigers had different degrees and types of government commitment. For instance, Korea, with its tight government-
chaebol nexus, was very different from Taiwan, where relations between government and business were much more arm’s
length. Over time, tensions developed between the Korean government and the chaebol, especially in the 1980s as the
government started to reduce its direct interventions and the chaebol felt they could do better without such interventions.
However, what was common to all successful industrial policy was the commitment to achieving dynamic competitiveness: it
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The best guide to the design of economic strategies is the experience of countries further along the
road of industrial development that pursued successful policies. Of course, the particular model
chosen has to suit the political and social conditions of the country: many governments firmly believe
in market oriented policies and may not wish to emulate the Korean strategy. Many may wish to do
so but lack the political economy to direct and control enterprises: Taiwan is a more useful model for
them. For those that believe in liberal trade policies and openness to FDI, the best model is
Singapore.
Skills: Industrial policy is very demanding of the technical and administrative skills in short supply in
most developing countries. Of course, the need for skills is not uniform, and depends on the level of
industrial development and the degree of selectivity aimed for. The more advanced the industrial
base and the more adventurous the strategy, the higher the levels of skills involved. In countries with
small and simple industrial activities, the strategies can be devised far more easily and their
implementation may need a smaller range of technical skills. The degree of selectivity must be geared
to the capabilities of the bureaucracy and the pace at which it can be improved. Note that strong
administrative capabilities are not required only for selective strategies; they are just as important for
market friendly policies to provide education, manage competition policy, collect and allocate
revenues and so on. Government skills are not given in perpetuity. Improved training, selection,
salaries, promotion and incentives can improve them. The social status of the civil service is a
determinant of its confidence and ability to liaise with the private sector.
Agency Problems: Policy makers have to devise suitable incentives and monitoring mechanisms to
ensure that the ‘contract’ between them and agents (mainly in the private sector) is enforced. The
Tigers did this in different ways: the most important and common one was export performance as a
monitoring and allocation device (‘creating contests’), but there were others. Banks acted as agents
of monitoring export policy. Regular meetings between industry and government permitted the inter-
flow of information, backed by detailed industry and strategy studies. Close contact between the
bureaucracy and industry was promoted, with personnel moving between the two. Korea’s
promotion of the chaebol allowed the government to limit the number of agents, and to use them as
interlocutors with the rest of the industrial sector. Industry associations also acted as interlocutors.
They also ensured close co-ordination with the private sector (World Bank, 1993).
Inflexibility: Many interventions turn out to be costly not so much because they are poorly designed
(private business makes huge mistakes all the time) but because changing course is difficult for
governments and there is little accountability for the outcome. Clearly, all interventions have to be
designed flexibly and monitored constantly so that mistakes can be rectified as they appear. There
are precedents in the corporate sector on how this can be done, but the use of export performance
is perhaps the best way to monitor export policies.
Sectional interests: While the ‘hijacking’ of policies by sectional interests is a danger in most
countries, regardless of the nature of policies, the danger is greater where the government has
selective as opposed to functional interventions. Strong leadership and institutions, and internal
checks on the allocation of favours, can offset this. That national interests can indeed dominate
sectional interests is illustrated by the Asian experience.
Corruption: There may be several levels of official corruption: the higher the level the more difficult
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may help reduce rampant corruption. At the top levels, however, if there is no one able to impose
sanctions on wrong-doers and there is no genuine commitment to economic development, there is
really no way of mounting selective, or indeed any useful development, policies. Venality at the top
will also tend to breed and condone that lower down the scale, and it follows that the greater the
risk of corruption the less selectivity should be exercised.
In general, the lower the capabilities, accountability and commitment of the government, the lower
the degree of selectivity that it can safely be entrusted with. The lower the level of selectivity, the
lower also the risks involved as well as the payoff in transforming the competitive structure. If a
rational choice of strategy differentiated by country were possible, the optimal one would take into
account present and future government capabilities. Unfortunately, governments do not choose
strategies on a realistic assessment of their capabilities and limitations. External advisors or
analysts may be able to provide such an assessment, but there is little guarantee that a government
will base its strategy on such advice.
5.2 Changing Environment for Policy
Developing countries are faced with a world in which industrial policy faces more limitations than at
the time the Asian Tigers mounted their interventions. Four factors affect this, two to do with the
changing economic reality and two with the policy framework adopted by national governments or
imposed upon them by the international ‘rules of the game’. They are taken in turn.
Accelerating Technical Change: So rapid and sweeping is technical change that analysts see the
emergence of a new ‘technological paradigm’ (Freeman and Perez, 1988). New technologies are
highly intensive in the use of information: new IT skills and the ability to network are among the most
important determinants of success. Innovation is changing the nature of knowledge and product
flows across countries (flows of people remain more limited and controlled), with rapid and often
striking changes in national comparative advantages. Transport and communications costs are falling,
and a growing portion of knowledge is available via the Internet at negligible cost. Part of the flow
of information is in the private domain, within companies or closed networks; a great deal is publicly
available, at least to those with equipment and skills to tap it.
Thus, today’s world is different from that when the strategies described above were formulated.
Rapid technical change reduces the scope for, and raises the risks of, some forms of industrial
policy: isolation from rapidly moving technologies may hold back the development of competitive
capabilities and make targeting more difficult. At the same time, however, there is greater need to
build the (more advanced) capabilities to absorb new technologies. Free market forces are not
conducive to costly and prolonged learning processes, and simply exposing a developing economy
to trade and investment may not take it much beyond the exploitation of static skills and low wages.
Globalization of production: Technical change and globalization are reflections of the same
phenomenon. The pace and rising costs of innovation make it necessary to sell to world markets and
to set up global production and distribution structures, while falling transport and communication
costs and new organisational techniques make this more feasible. MNCs are increasingly integrated
production structures across countries (within their own networks as well as between themselves
and independent firms) and rationalising supply and distribution structures. This is leading in many
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themselves increasingly dominate trade, so that their participation becomes essential for certain kinds
of export dynamism.
However, as noted, globalization is a highly uneven process. Market driven trade and investment
are not leading to an equitable distribution of the benefits of new technology. The spread of
underlying comparative advantages is even less equitable. Innovation continues to be the preserve of
a handful of countries; within them the process is concentrated in a relatively few large enterprises.
While the main innovators are the large multinationals, the engines of globalization, their foreign
investment activity does not lead the knowledge base to be more widely diffused. The technology
that MNCs deploy in any location depends on the ability of that location to absorb that knowledge
— to provide the ‘immobile elements’ (UNCTAD, 1999). Those with low capabilities receive the
simplest operational know-how, with the danger that their competitive base remains static. Those
with high capabilities receive more advanced forms (in some cases the R&D process itself) and the
base advances over time in interaction with MNC activity. There is new entry from developing
countries, but from a small number led by the Tigers analysed here. The majority of developing
countries remain on the periphery, facing the risk of increasing marginalisation.
As with technical change, globalisation renders some past industrial policy instruments less useful or
most risky and costly. For instance, the exclusion of FDI is less feasible as a means of boosting
domestic technologies: few countries have the ability to match international innovation on their own.
The same applies to exporting scale-intensive products like automobiles or high technology ones like
electronics: few developing countries have domestic enterprises with the ability to mount export
drives to match MNC integrated production networks. The ability to impose conditions on MNCs is
also more limited, as more countries seek FDI. Even the independence of MNC affiliates from
parent companies is circumscribed by tighter organisational and information controls.
However, this does not imply the need for a laissez faire policy in investment or capability building.
As rational profit-making enterprises, MNCs exploit existing rather than potential competitive
advantages in host countries – it is up to the countries to improve their advantages by raising skills
and capabilities. Many simple manufacturing activities are not undertaken by MNCs, and their
affiliates also need a strong base of local suppliers to boost local content: both need policies to
promote domestic enterprises. In fact, the stronger the domestic enterprise base, the higher the
‘quality’ of inward FDI and its spillover benefits. Then, as the Singapore example shows, attracting
FDI into high value activities needs targeting and intervention. Thus, a strong role of government
remains in a globalising world, in some respects stronger than before.
Policy liberalization: The most direct influence on industrial policy is the widespread move to
liberalisation. Practically developing countries are reducing trade and investment barriers, willingly or
under pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions, aid donors and, increasingly, the WTO
(below). The forces driving liberalization are partly ideological in nature, but they also reflect
disillusionment with import substituting, state-ownership strategies. Many effects of liberalization
have been beneficial. Existing comparative advantages that were held back by inefficient controls are
now better exploited. Increased competition has forced enterprises to raise efficiency or die out.
Improved resource allocation between enterprises and activities has sometimes promoted growth
and investment. The more open access to information has not only raised the flow of productive
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At the same time, liberalization is damaging industry in many countries. The case of SSA is the most
striking (Lall, ed., 1999), but there are examples elsewhere, particularly in Latin America. Even
where enterprises survive and upgrade production technology, there are instances of lower
technological effort as they become more dependent on imported know-how. This holds back their
technological deepening and affects their longer-term competitiveness in complex activities. Most
important, the renunciation of trade interventions takes away the most powerful tool for promoting
new activities and developing infant industries. The theoretical basis for liberalization is weak (Lall
and Latsch, 1998), unable to support the massive superstructure of neoliberal policy built upon it.
New rules of the game: Policy liberalisation within developing countries is shaped, forced and
reinforced, by the ‘rules of the game’. These are the rules, procedures and norms embodied in
international trade and investment agreements; the arbiters are the donors, along with international
institutions like the IMF, WTO and World Bank. These rules narrow further the role of government
in economic life, and subject economies to competition and globalization more strongly (though
advanced countries are able to manipulate the rules better than others). Under the WTO, they
acquire greater force, since the rules now have sanctions to back them up. The rules are spreading
to FDI, local content, government procurement, intellectual property rights, and services: under
present trends, they will impose a ‘level playing field’ on all participating countries. If the level
playing field restrains the development of national capabilities, the new rules will increase the
dominance of the strong and hold back the weak. This seems to accord with current trends.
To sum up, liberalisation, technical change and globalization mean that countries are faced with much
stronger technological and competitive challenge than before. In theory, the new forces encourage
and facilitate learning. They increase the efficiency with which knowledge is transmitted across
countries, and remove many of the policies that cut countries off from information flows and
distorted the incentives to utilise them. The exploitation of new technologies is undertaken with
increasing rapidity in different locations, by MNCs or by local firms. Level playing fields remove
information barriers and lower transaction costs to enterprises. The same trends make it more
difficult to mount industrial policy, partly for economic reasons and partly for political ones. They
raise the speed of technical change, the quantity of information available and the breadth and depth
of skills and institutions needed to cope. If countries are thrust into this without the ability to cope,
and without the tools to build that ability, they will remain beggars at the technological feast. In
fact, they will be more marginal than before, since rapid exposure to competition would devastate
their fledgling industrial sectors and destroy the small base of capabilities.
6. Industrial Policy in Africa
The poor performance of African manufacturing industry is well documented (see, for instance, Lall
and Wangwe, 1998) The structure of manufacturing is backward, dominated by the (minimal)
processing of natural resources and by simple consumer goods industries. Import liberalization (with
competition largely from other developing countries) is devastating exposed industries, including the
simple ones that led export growth in Asia. Despite low wages and welcoming policies on FDI,
there is little sign of resources flowing into new, export-oriented manufacturing activities. Apart from
primary resources, linkages of large firms with local suppliers remain minimal and superficial.
Technological efficiency and dynamism remain low. In many cases manufacturing has been a drag
on, rather than engine for, economic growth and structural transformation. Governments have
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failure of government in Africa (for comprehensive surveys see Soludo, 1997, 1998), and on
drawing lessons from the Asian Tigers (Stein, 1995).
Part of the explanation for poor industrial performance in SSA lies in exogenous shocks: droughts,
wars, internal conflict, political instability, adverse terms of trade and so on. Bad macroeconomic
management, debt, inflation and uncertainty also played important roles. So did policies affecting
industry: enforced public ownership, nationalisation, price controls, infrastructure lags and so on. All
these taken into account, there is still a considerable part that is due to poor industrial policy:
mistakes in trade, domestic competition and ownership policies, wrong interventions in technology
transfer and development, weak human capital creation and neglect of institutional support. But why
did industrial policies have such poor effects? Part of the reason lies in structural features and part in
the design and implementation of policies.
Structural factors: The structural factors that deterred industrial development include the small size
and fragmentation of local and regional markets, poor infrastructure, low entrepreneurial base and
weak human, particularly technical, capital (with gaps with other regions rising over time).
Policy factors: These include
§  Poor information and capabilities on the part of policy makers, neglect of lessons from other
regions, insufficient data, inability to withstand analytical pressure from outside agencies and
experts, weak negotiation in and preparation for WTO membership and so on
§  Lack of clear industrial policy objectives, conflicts with other objectives
§  Excessive and prolonged protection not offset by export promotion measures or pressures that
would provide incentives for learning and upgrading
§  Inadequate domestic competition policies to stimulate technological upgrading, permit the entry
of dynamic new enterprises and enforce competitive behaviour
§  Lack of coherence between product and factor market policies, such as education and training,
technology support, capital markets and export promotion
§  Inability to target and attract FDI into efficient manufacturing and facilitate the upgrading
§  Weak, often non-existent, institutional structure for supporting capability development: training
institutions, effective quality and standards bodies, R&D support and SME extension services;
practically no linkages between institutions that do exist and the industrial sector
§  Lack of involvement of industrialists in policy design and implementation
§  No monitoring of industrial policy and its effects, no flexibility in adapting policies to changing
world market and technological conditions
§  Weak legal structures to facilitate property rights and contract, dispute resolution and so on
§  Widespread and constant political intervention, corruption at all levels, lack of commitment and
infighting by bureaucrats and leaders.
7. The Way Forward
What is the way forward for industrial policy in Africa? Most countries are already committed to
liberalization and options have to be considered in this context. The base of technological capabilities
in Africa (what remains of it) is weak. The liberalisation process is rapid and not guided by a
strategy. There is little attempt to gear the opening up to the learning needs of different activities.
Support policies are virtually non-existent; on the contrary, the institutions that can assist the
adjustment process are weak and isolated from industry. This places the entire burden of adjustmentQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 33
on firms that lack the knowledge, resources and skills to upgrade to international levels. Clearly
industrial policy is necessary but in a new form.
The scope for industrial policy left under the new rules remains a grey area. Much may depend on
the skills of the government concerned in designing measures that are permitted or camouflaging
ones that are not. It also necessary to build strong government capabilities to deal with trade
disputes in the WTO; all major exporting countries are now engaged (voluntarily or otherwise) in
constant battles with importers or competitors on detailed, technical matters that can have important
repercussions on their export and import performance. Countries that fail to develop the legal and
economic expertise to cope with these disputes risk losing competitive advantage.
In any case, the new rules do not completely rule out industrial policies. The opening up is more
complete in some countries than in others, and there is still scope to alter the pace and content of the
opening up. Most countries have a grace period before they have to fully liberalise trade and
investment. Depending on the WTO terms agreed upon, they might be able to further prolong the
period or seek exceptions for particular industries or in particular periods. Measures such as export
subsidies, local content rules, new quantitative restrictions on trade, discrimination against investors
by origin are very difficult or impossible to launch now: the only flexibility remains on how quickly
and uniformly they are phased out. For Sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, the management of the
liberalisation process that offers one potential avenue for the exercise of industrial policy over the
medium term. The other, considered below, is supply side policies of the type being increasingly
used in industrial countries as part of competitiveness strategy.
The TC approach suggests the need for gradualism in the liberalisation process. It proposes the
removal of high, sustained and indiscriminate protection and other barriers to competition. These
distort the incentive structure and curtail or distort the process of capability building. However, the
introduction of competition has to be subject to the time and resource needs of learning. Firms
brought up in a protected environment have to relearn competitive capabilities, and this calls for
clear signals on liberalization along with supporting measures in factor markets. The provision of
these measures is a complex task, involving active government policies and guidance.
5 It has to be
undertaken with a strategy, within a time-bound program and with the final objective of becoming
fully competitive.
Asia offers lessons in liberalization as well as intervention. Korea, for instance, started to liberalise in
the 1980s in a gradual manner, retaining considerable control over resource allocation during the
process. It accompanied opening up with a strategy of restructuring and upgrading, rather than a
rapid, indiscriminate and sweeping exposure to international market forces. The speed of
liberalisation was based on a realistic, detailed and differentiated assessment of which activities were
viable in the medium term, with the process geared to the learning and ‘relearning’ needs of various
activities. At the same time, there were strong pressures on industries to invest in building up new
capabilities to face import competition within a limited period. It was designed to overcome
market failures, not to ignore them. It involved close monitoring of the progress of liberalisation,
and it requires that the government is able to address the supply side needs of industries along with
allowing a phased process of liberalisation. The strategy was developed in collaboration with the
                                                
5 Interestingly, the case for infant industry protection is accepted by the World Bank study by Biggs et al.(1995), while the
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industrial sector, and pre-announced so that enterprises had time to adjust. Once announced,
however, governments were able to stick to the programme to minimise backsliding and ‘hijacking’
by inefficient performers.
This is clearly a better strategy of adjustment for African countries than the adjustment they are now
undertaking. Note that to recommend a gradual and nuanced strategy of liberalisation is not to
suggest that the sample countries simply abort the adjustment process. What is needed is not to
delay the adjustment and then do little else, but to actively prepare for it in the grace period
provided. Even with well-designed adjustment policies, the outcome cannot be expected to be the
same as that of East Asia, since the initial conditions, capabilities, market size, location and
infrastructures are very different.
Government capabilities have to be greatly improved (with information, training, better incentives
and greater insulation from the political process) to make gradual liberalisation work effectively. In
contrast to the neoclassical position that the removal of governments restores economic efficiency, it
is the strengthening of governments that is needed to make markets work properly. The most
difficult part of an effective industrial policy is perhaps to design a coherent strategy. Most
governments are not geared to this. Decisions affecting industrial development and competitiveness
are scattered over an array of ministries and institutions: finance, trade, industry, labour, education,
science and technology. These often have different objectives and communicate poorly, if at all, with
each other. The first step is to set up an agency that can mount a strategy cutting across competing
interests and using the resources of each ministry to further national aims. Something like a high-
powered ‘Industrial Development Council’, headed by a Cabinet minister and reporting directly
to the head of government (who must be genuinely committed to industrial development), is an
essential prerequisite.
Then comes the issue of which activities need to be specially promoted as engines of dynamic
comparative advantage. This is ultimately a matter of informed judgement. Existing export activities
have to be divided between those that need special efforts to be promoted and those doing well as
they are. Among the former a distinction has be made between those which do not have a viable
future (‘sunset’ industries) and those that do; the former should treated with benign neglect. Labour-
intensive activities like garments are not necessarily sunset industries, even though many East Asian
countries are treating them as such. The Italian example shows how well exports can be expanded in
a low technology, labour-intensive activity, as long as quality, design and flexibility can be raised
sufficiently. This type of upgrading has to be a vital part of export strategy, not just picking new
winners in high-tech activities. The selection has to be based on the current base of capabilities, the
example of other countries, feasible rates of improvement in domestic factor markets and the
expected evolution of demand.
In the absence of trade interventions and subsidies, how are these activities to be promoted?
Governments have to rely mainly on supply side support to selected activities. This can involve
attracting FDI to targeted activities, with incentives for higher value added technologies, and building
the skill, technology support and supplier base needed for foreign investors. It must also involve
similar measures to strengthen domestic enterprises. Artificial constraints to competition have to be
removed, and the usual biases in policy against SMEs removed. State owned enterprises must be
reformed or privatised as necessary to make them efficient, and they must be subjected to the same
market discipline as private enterprises. A range of support institutions must be built or improved. InQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 35
addition, governments must support ‘horizontal’ activities like training and technological effort by
enterprises by giving non-specific incentives (Lall and Teubal, 1998). Exports must be supported by
agencies that can help all firms to access information and markets.
Competitiveness policy as it has evolved in advanced industrial countries provides useful guides to
acceptable strategies. Apart from the supply side measures noted, these countries use tools like
benchmarking to help enterprises understand their weaknesses and reach best practice levels. There
is an increasing use of benchmarking for support institutions as well. Governments invest heavily in
education and training, and provide incentives to enterprises to strengthen their training systems.
They promote R&D and high-tech clusters, and pay particular attention to the creation of technology
oriented financial instruments. The upgrading of infrastructure, particularly that related to IT, is
regarded as high priority. Technology policy is set by conducting ‘Technology Foresight’ exercises
to develop a consensus on future needs between industry, research bodies, academics and
governments.
The private sector (generally through associations) plays a closely collaborative, often lead, role in all
these efforts. Support institutions and universities are given incentives to be more responsive to
industry needs. Many public services and agencies are privatised or thrown open to private sector
provision. This can be very effective in such areas as training, testing, consultancy and marketing.
Some countries target support policies to industry clusters rather than individual activities.
Beyond these generalisations, the specific forms industrial policy takes must depend on a host of
context-specific factors. It is to be hoped that this study will illuminate these factors.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS48 Page 36
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